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Abstract 
 
For the case of three alternatives, an elementary extension of the system of axioms for the Condorcet Improvement 
is presented in order to expand the indecision region for pairwise voting vectors beyond uniform cycles, The 
resulting modification of the Condorcet Improvement criterion on pairwise votes is derived.  The Condorcet 
Improvement is the decision criterion on pairwise voting vectors which modifies the Condorcet winner criterion by 
expanding winner regions over cyclic votes in a manner that the intensity of preference on a pair of alternatives by 
voters  is reflected.  In the extension, an axiom is added to eliminate a small influence by a particular type of 
perturbation on cyclic profiles that intends to discriminates against an alternative by dropping it from the set of 
candidates for a winner by the Condorcet Improvement.  A threshold is used in this axiom in order to identify such 
a small influence.  Graphically in the space of pairwise votes, the extension makes the indecision region to be a 
triangular swelling of the line segment that is the indecision region of the Condorcet Improvement without a 
threshold.  The winner regions are reduced by eliminating pairwise voting vectors that belong to the expanded 
indecision region.  This article is an abbreviated presentation of the main result in Kaneko (2016).    
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1. Introduction 
This article is an abbreviated presentation of the main result in Kaneko (2016), which gives an 
axiomatic foundation for introducing a threshold to the Condorcet Improvement which 
intends to expand the indecision region for pairwise voting vectors beyond uniform cycles 
and derive its consequent modification of the Condorcet Improvement criterion on pairwise 
vote, for the case of three alternatives. The cyclic coordinate system is used to identify 
“almost'' confused voters, which are non-confused only by discriminating against an 
alternative slightly.  Given a positive threshold less than ଶଷ, the system of axioms for the Condorcet Improvement is extended with an axiom that an “almost” confused voters with a 
level of discrimination no more than the threshold is identified with a confused voter.  It is 
proved that, under the extended system of axioms,  the indecision region is expanded to a 
triangular swelling of the line segment ቂቀെ ଵଷ , െ
ଵ
ଷ , െ
ଵ
ଷቁ , ቀ
ଵ
ଷ ,
ଵ
ଷ ,
ଵ
ଷቁቃ, which is the indecision region for Condorcet Improvement without the threshold.   
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  The Condorcet Improvement (abbreviated as CI hereafter) is the decision criterion on 
pairwise voting which modifies the Condorcet winner criterion by expanding winner regions   
over cyclic votes in a manner that the intensity of preference on a pair of alternatives by 
voters  is reflected. An axiomatic foundation of the Condorcet Improvement is given in Saari 
(1994) and Saari (1995) for the case of three alternatives. A crucial axiom implies that the 
region of cyclic votes is partitioned according to a count of preference intensity exhibited in 
the ranking of alternatives by each voter.  It turns out that the Condorcet Improvement is 
equivalent to the social outcome mapping based on the Borda rule, a particular positional 
voting method with a symmetric scoring vector.   
  The role of a threshold in expanding the indecision region of CI is to make a winner robust 
to a small perturbation of a profile of voters by “almost” confused voters.  Since CI 
generically calls a winner even if a pairwise voting vector is cyclic, any voter who is 
arbitrarily close to a confused voter can be pivotal.  Such a voter can be considered to be a 
disguise of a confused voter.  A disguise  has a minimal effect on the selection of a winner if 
only one alternative is dropped out of being a winner, since the set of candidates for a winner 
is minimally affected.  However, if such disguises are made simultaneously, the pairwise 
voting vector is generically moved to a winner region of CI. A threshold  is used to neutralize 
a disguise of a confused voter by dropping an alternative from candidates of a winner to a 
confused voter, in  order to eliminate a vulnerability of a winner by simultaneous disguises of 
a confused voter.       
  Throughout the analysis, use is made of the cyclic coordinate system for pairwise voting, 
which is introduced in Saari (1994) and Saari (1995).  It represents a profile in view of a 
grouping of voter types into two groups, each of which creates either a positive or a negative 
cycle in pairwise voting.   
  The article is organized as follows. The relevant outset of voting theory and the voting maps, 
one for pairwise voting and the other for positional voting, are reviewed briefly in the section 
2. The expansion of the indecision region by introducing a threshold to CI is presented in the 
section 3.   Remarks on issues related to the result are given in the section 4.    
             
2. Outset and Pairwise Voting Map 
First, I briefly introduce the outset and the voting maps of concern, which are all taken from 
Saari (1994) and Saari (1995).  In the following, the (l-1)-dimensional basic simplex in the 
Euclidean space Թ௟ is denoted by Δl-1.   
  Throughout the article, it is assumed that there are three alternatives.  The set of alternatives 
is {c1, c2, c3}.  It is assumed that each voter has a strict ordering on the alternatives. There are 
total 3! = 6 strict orderings of alternatives, and they are numbered as in the table 2.1.  
 
Number Type of strict ordering
1 ܿଵ ≻ ܿଶ ≻ ܿଷ 
2 ܿଵ ≻ ܿଷ ≻ ܿଶ 
3 ܿଷ ≻ ܿଵ ≻ ܿଶ 
4 ܿଷ ≻ ܿଶ ≻ ܿଵ 
5 ܿଶ ≻ ܿଷ ≻ ܿଵ 
6 ܿଶ ≻ ܿଵ ≻ ܿଷ 
Table 2.1. Strict orderings on alternatives 
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A tuple of strict orderings on alternatives across all voters is called a profile.  A strict ordering 
corresponds to a type of voters.  A  profile can be represented as a vector in Δ5. whose 
components show the ratio of voters for each type. A profile represented as such is denoted by 
p.  For ݆ ∈ ሼ1,2,3,4,5,6ሽ, pj  is the ratio of the voters of type j.   
  The pairwise voting map is defined as follows.  Let ordered pairs of alternatives be 
numbered as in the table 2.2.  
  
Number Ordered pair 
of alternatives 
1 ሺܿଵ, ܿଶሻ 
2 ሺܿଶ, ܿଷሻ 
3 ሺܿଷ, ܿଵሻ 
Table 2.2.  Pairs of alternatives 
 
A pairwise voting vector is a vector ݍ ∈ ሾെ1,1ሿଷ, where qi  is a a relative vote for the first 
alternative to the second one in the pair of alternatives indexed by i, for ݅ ∈ ሼ1,2,3ሽ.  The 
pairwise voting map associates a profile with pairwise voting vector.  Specifically, it is a map 
ܨଷ: ߂ହ → ሾെ1,1ሿଷdefined by 
ܨଷ ≡ ቌ ෍ ݌௝
௝ୀଵ.ଶ.ଷ
െ ෍ ݌௝
௝ୀସ.ହ.଺
, ෍ ݌௝
௝ୀଵ.ହ.଺
െ ෍ ݌௝
௝ୀଶ.ଷ.ସ
, ෍ ݌௝
௝ୀଷ.ସ.ହ
െ ෍ ݌௝
௝ୀଵ.ଶ.଺
ቍ. 
Its image is a subset of ሾെ1,1ሿଷbetween two planes, ∑ ݍ௜௜ୀଵ,ଶ,ଷ ൌ 1and ∑ ݍ௜௜ୀଵ,ଶ,ଷ ൌ െ1, and 
is denoted by ImF3.   
  A pairwise vote has a one-to-one relationship with a normalized Borda rule vote, and in fact 
CI is equivalent to the Borda rule voting. Hence the threshold imposed on CI can be 
transferred to the positional voting methods.  A positional voting vector is a vector ݒ ∈ ߂ଶ, 
where vj  denotes the total score for the alternative cj for ݆ ∈ ሼ1,2,3ሽ.  A normalized scoring 
vector is a vector ݓ௦ ≡ ሺ1 െ ݏ. ݏ. 0ሻfor a ݏ ∈ ቂ0, ଵଶቃ.  For ݇ ∈ ሼ1,2,3ሽ, the k-th component of ws is the score given to the k-th ranked alternative.  The positional voting map associates a 
couple of a profile and a scoring vector with a positional voting vector.  Specifically, it is a 
map ݂: ߂ହ ൈ ቂ0, ଵଶቃ → ߂ଶ defined by 
݂ሺ݌, ݏሻ ≡ ෍݌௝
଺
௝ୀଵ
ሾݓ௦ሿ௝, 
where ሾݓ௦ሿ௝ is a vector obtained by a permutation of the components of ݓ௦ according to the 
strict ordering of alternatives indexed by j, for each ݆ ∈ ሼ1,2,3,4,5,6ሽ.  They are shown in the 
table 2.3.   
 
Permuted 
scoring vector 
Vector in the 
component form
ሾݓ௦ሿଵ ሺ1 െ ݏ, ݏ, 0ሻ 
ሾݓ௦ሿଶ ሺ1 െ ݏ, 0, ݏሻ 
ሾݓ௦ሿଷ ሺݏ, 0,1 െ ݏሻ 
ሾݓ௦ሿସ ሺ0, ݏ, 1 െ ݏሻ 
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Permuted 
scoring vector 
Vector in the 
component form
ሾݓ௦ሿହ ሺ0,1 െ ݏ, ݏሻ 
ሾݓ௦ሿ଺ ሺݏ, 1 െ ݏ, 0ሻ 
Table 2.3.  Permuted scoring vectors 
 
 
Given a ݏ ∈ ቂ0, ଵଶቃ, the image of the map ௦݂ ≡ ݂ሺ. , ݏሻ , denoted by Imfs, is a convex hull 
spanned by vectors ൛ሾݓ௦ሿ௝ൟ௝ୀଵ,ଶ,ଷ,ସ,ହ,଺ .  The Borda rule voting corresponds to ݏ ൌ
ଵ
ଷ.  The 
plurality voting corresponds to ݏ ൌ 0, while the anti-plurality voting corresponds to ݏ ൌ ଵଶ.    
 
3. An Axiomatic Foundation of CI with a Threshold 
The purpose of developing CI with or without a threshold is to partition ImF3 into the 
following regions;  
ܦ௜(݅ ൌ 1,2,3): ci  wins,  
ܦ௜,௜ାଵ(݅ ൌ 1,2,3, mod 3): ci  and ci+1 are tied at the top,  
ܧ: no winner is decided.   
CI without a threshold introduces a set of axioms on which these regions are identified as an 
acceptable modification of the Condorcet winner criterion.  I introduce a threshold of size ε 
into CI for reducing the influence of “almost” confused voters in a profile.  Confused voters 
are profiles making cyclic votes.  In ImF3, the direct influence of confused voters appears on 
the line segment ቂቀെ ଵଷ , െ
ଵ
ଷ , െ
ଵ
ଷቁ , ቀ
ଵ
ଷ ,
ଵ
ଷ ,
ଵ
ଷቁቃ, which is the indecision region for CI without a threshold. By introducing a threshold, the indecision region must be expanded to include the 
line segment in its interior.  
  In Saari (1994) and Saari (1995), a coordinate system on the set of profiles based on 
pairwise voting vectors, called as the cycle coordinate system, is introduced. It helps for 
identifying effects of positive and negative confused voters in the pairwise voting.  The cyclic 
coordinate of a profile p is a tuple ൫ߙሺ݌ሻ, ߚሺ݌ሻ, ݀ሺ݌ሻ൯, where 
ߙሺ݌ሻ ൌ ܨଷ ቆቀ ௣భ௣భା௣యା௣ఱ , 0,
௣య
௣భା௣యା௣ఱ , 0,
௣ఱ
௣భା௣యା௣ఱ , 0ቁቇ,  
ߚሺ݌ሻ ൌ ܨଷ ቆቀ0, ௣మ௣మା௣రା௣ల , 0,
௣ర
௣మା௣రା௣ల , 0,
௣ల
௣మା௣రା௣లቁቇ and  
݀ሺ݌ሻ ൌ ݌ଵ ൅ ݌ଷ ൅ ݌ହ.   
 
By letting ଵܶ ≡ ൛ݍ ∈ ܫ݉ܨଷ	ห ∑ ݍ௝௝ୀଵ,ଶ,ଷ ൌ 1ൟ and ܶି ଵ ≡ ൛ݍ ∈ ܫ݉ܨଷ	ห ∑ ݍ௝௝ୀଵ,ଶ,ଷ ൌ െ1ൟ ,  
ߙሺ݌ሻ ∈ ଵܶand ߚሺ݌ሻ ∈ ܶି ଵ. The map defined by ሺߙ, ߚ, ݀ሻ is one-to-one except for profiles for which the sum of components for the value by F3 is either 1 or -1. For such profiles, either 
ߙ or ߚ  can be neglected in an obvious way.  It is clear that ܨଷሺ݌ሻ ൌ ݀ሺ݌ሻߙሺ݌ሻ ൅ ൫1 െ
݀ሺ݌ሻ൯ߚሺ݌ሻ.  
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  The positive confused voter pc+ is the profile ቀଵଷ , 0.
ଵ
ଷ , 0,
ଵ
ଷ , 0ቁ, and the negative confused 
voter pc- is the profile ቀ0, ଵଷ , 0.
ଵ
ଷ , 0,
ଵ
ଷቁ.  Any convex combination of these profiles is called as 
a confused voter.  The former  is a unique profile that has the value of  F3  to be ቀଵଷ ,
ଵ
ଷ ,
ଵ
ଷቁ, 
while the latter is a unique profile that has the value of F3  to be ቀെ ଵଷ , െ
ଵ
ଷ , െ
ଵ
ଷቁ . The 
difference between ߙሺ݌ሻ  and ቀଵଷ ,
ଵ
ଷ ,
ଵ
ଷቁ  is a measure for the degree of freedom from the 
positive confused voter, and that between ߚሺ݌ሻ and ቀെ ଵଷ , െ
ଵ
ଷ , െ
ଵ
ଷቁ is that from the negative confused voter.  It is intended that a threshold is used to identify a profile p for which  each of 
ߙሺ݌ሻand ߚሺ݌ሻ are close to positive or negative confused voters, correspondingly.    
  An axiom for CI without a threshold claims that, if a profile consists of voter types for which 
an alternative is ranked at the bottom and the other two alternatives are tied in the pairwise 
vote, then it must be decided that those two alternatives are tied at the top.  A confused voter 
can be perturbed in any small degree to make two alternatives dominate another but are tied 
each other. A threshold is used to guarantee that such a perturbation does not rank any 
alternative bellow others socially if the size of perturbation is small. All confused voters are 
treated equally, so that the effect of a threshold must be uniform over confused voters.  Based 
on this argument, Kaneko (2016) proposes the following set of axioms to refine CI with a 
threshold ߳.    
Axiom 1.   For each ݅ ∈ ሼ1,2,3ሽ, Di  is an open convex set. For each ݅ ∈ ሼ1,2,3ሽ (mod 3).  Di,i+1 
is a subset of the intersection of boundaries of Di and Di+1 and a convex set.  E is a closed 
convex set.   
Axiom 2.   The set ܦଵ ∪ ܦଶ ∪ ܦଷ ∪ ܧ is dense in ImF3.    
Axiom 3.    For each ݅ ∈ ሼ1,2,3ሽ, let Ci  be  the set of all pairwise voting vectors for which the 
alternative ci is the winner by CI without a threshold.  Then ܦ௜ ൌ ܥ௜ ∖ ܧ for all ݅ ∈ ሼ1,2,3ሽ.     
Axiom 4.  For some ߳ ∈ ቀ0, ଶଷቁ, the following statements hold.   
4.1. Let pc+(i, λ) (pc-(i, λ)) be the profile obtained by modifying the positive (negative) 
confused voter in the way that the type which ranks ci at the bottom is increased by ఒଶ and the 
type which ranks ci at the top is reduced by ఒଶ.  Then F3(pc+(i, λ)) (F3(pc-(i, λ)))  belongs to E if and only if ߣ ൑ ߳.    
4.2. If a profile p satisfies α(p)=α(pc+(i, λ)) and β(p)=β(pc-(i, λ)), then F3(p) is in E if and only 
if ߣ ൑ ߳.   
4.3. For a profile p, let pc be the profile having the cycle coordinate (α(pc+), β(pc-), d(p)).  
Also, for each ݅ ∈ ሼ1,2,3ሽ,  let pc(i, λ) be the profile having the cycle coordinate  (α(pc+(i, λ)), 
β(pc-(i, λ)), d(p)).  Then, if ܨଷሺ݌ሻ ∈ ܥ௜ , ܨଷሺ݌ሻ ∈ ܧ  if and only if F3(p) is non-negatively spanned by F3(pc), F3(pc(i+1, ε)) and F3(pc(i+2, ε)) (mod 3).     
  
With this set of axioms, Kaneko (2016) derives the following refinement of CI.   
 
Theorem.  
   A partition of ImF3 into Di (i=1,2,3), Di, i+1(݅ ∈ ሼ1,2,3ሽ, mod 3) and E satisfies the axioms 1-
4 if and only if these sets are determined as follows;  
 ܧ ൌ ൛݀ߙ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݀ሻߚ	ห	ߙ ∈ ଵܶ෡ , ߚ ∈ ܶି ଵ෢ , ݀ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿൟ,  
 ܦ௜ ൌ ܥ௜ ∖ ܧ (i=1,2,3),  
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 ܦ௜,௜ାଵ ൌ ൫ܾ݀ሺܥ௜ሻ ∩ ܾ݀ሺܥ௜ାଵሻ൯ ∖ ܧ (݅ ∈ ሼ1,2,3ሽ, mod 3)}.    
where bd(Ci) is the boundary of Ci in ImF3 for i=1,2,3, and 
ଵܶ෡ ൌ ݐ݄݁ݐݎ݈݅ܽ݊݃݁ݓ݅ݐ݄ݒ݁ݎݐ݅ܿ݁ݏ	 ቀଵଷ,
ଵ
ଷ ൅ ߳,
ଵ
ଷ െ ߳ቁ , ቀ
ଵ
ଷ െ ߳,
ଵ
ଷ ,
ଵ
ଷ ൅ ߳ቁ , ቀ
ଵ
ଷ ൅ ߳,
ଵ
ଷ െ ߳,
ଵ
ଷቁ,  
 ܶି ଵ
෢ ൌ ݐ݄݁ݐݎ݈݅ܽ݊݃݁ݓ݅ݐ݄ݒ݁ݎݐ݅ܿ݁ݏ	 ቀെ ଵଷ , െ
ଵ
ଷ ൅ ߳,െ
ଵ
ଷ െ ߳ቁ , ቀെ
ଵ
ଷ െ ߳,െ
ଵ
ଷ , െ
ଵ
ଷ ൅ ߳ቁ ,
ቀെ ଵଷ ൅ ߳,െ
ଵ
ଷ െ ߳,െ
ଵ
ଷቁ .
 
 
In Saari (1994) and Saari (1995), it is derived that  
ܥ௜ ൌ ሼݍ ∈ ܫ݉ܨଷ	|	2ݍ௜ ൐ ݍ௜ାଵ ൅ ݍ௜ାଶ, 2ݍ௜ାଶ ൏ ݍ௜ ൅ ݍ௜ାଵሽ (mod 3), for each ݅ ∈ ሼ1,2,3ሽ.  On 
the section of ImF3 by the plane ൛ݍ	ห ∑ ݍ௜௜ୀଵ,ଶ,ଷ ൌ ݐൟ (ݐ ∈ ሾെ1,1ሿ), E becomes the closed 
triangle with vertices ቀ௧ଷ,
௧
ଷ ൅ ߳,
௧
ଷ െ ߳ቁ, ቀ
௧
ଷ െ ߳,
௧
ଷ ,
௧
ଷ ൅ ߳ቁ andቀ
௧
ଷ ൅ ߳,
௧
ଷ െ ߳,
௧
ଷቁ .   The rest of the 
partition on the section can be easily figured out with these.   
  The proof of the theorem in Kaneko (2016) derives the partition on the section directly by an 
elementary calculation.   Let Ht be the intersection of ImF3 and the plane ൛ݍ	ห	∑ ݍ௜௜ୀଵ,ଶ,ଷ ൌ ݐൟ.  
Consider any  profile p such that ܨଷሺ݌ሻ ∈ ܪ௧ .  It is trivial to see that ݀ሺ݌ሻ ൌ ଵା௧ଶ for such profiles, so that they have the same d-coordinate.  An elementary calculation shows that 
F3(pc+(i-1, λ)i+k = 1/3 + kλ for ݅ ∈ ሼ1,2,3ሽand ݇ ∈ ሼെ1,0,1ሽ (mod 3). Similarly, F3(pc-(i-1, λ)i+k 
= -(1/3) + kλ for ݅ ∈ ሼ1,2,3ሽand ݇ ∈ ሼെ1,0,1ሽ  (mod 3).  Therefore, we have ܨଷ൫݌௖ሺ݅ െ
1, ߣሻ൯௜ା௞ ൌ
௧
ଷ ൅ ݇ߣ  for ݅ ∈ ሼ1,2,3ሽ and ݇ ∈ ሼെ1,0,1ሽ  (mod 3).  Let ܪప෢ ≡ሼݍ ∈ ܫ݉ܨଷ	|	2ݍ௜ ൌ ݍ௜ାଵ ൅ ݍ௜ାଶ	ሺ݉݋݀	3ሻሽfor i=1,2,3.  Then F3(pc(i-1, λ)i is in ܪప෢and not in Ci-
1.  Since ܨଷ൫݌௖ሺ݅ െ 1,0ሻ൯ ൌ ܨଷሺ݌௖ሻ ൌ ቀ௧ଷ,
௧
ଷ,
௧
ଷቁ , ߣ ൑
ଶ
ଷ  guarantees that F3(pc(i-1, λ) is in 
ܾ݀ሺܥ௜ሻ ∩ ܾ݀ሺܥ௜ାଵሻ ∩ ܪ௧.   By the axiom 3 and 4,  
ܦ௜ ∩ ܪ௧ ൌ ሾܥ௜ ∩ ܪ௧ሿ
∖ ݐ݄݁ݐݎ݈݅ܽ݊݃݁ݓ݅ݐ݄ݒ݁ݎݐ݁ܿ݁ݏ ൬ ݐ3,
ݐ
3,
ݐ
3൰ , ܨଷ൫݌
௖ሺ݅ െ 1, ߳ሻ൯, ܨଷ൫݌௖ሺ݅ ൅ 1, ߳ሻ൯ 
 (mod 3).  By the axiom 1 and 2,  
 (mod 3).   
They imply that  
ܧ ∩ ܪ௧ ൌ ݐ݄݈݁ܿ݋ݏ݁݀ݐݎ݈݅ܽ݊݃݁ݓ݅ݐ݄ݒ݁ݎݐ݁ܿ݁ݏ ൬ݐ3 ,
ݐ
3 ൅ ߳,
ݐ
3 െ ߳൰ , ൬
ݐ
3 െ ߳,
ݐ
3 ,
ݐ
3 ൅ ߳൰ , ൬
ݐ
3 ൅ ߳,
ݐ
3
െ ߳, ݐ3൰. 
The theorem follows easily by integrating these sets for ݐ ∈ ሾെ1,1ሿ, or along the line segment 
ቂቀെ ଵଷ , െ
ଵ
ଷ , െ
ଵ
ଷቁ , ቀ
ଵ
ଷ ,
ଵ
ଷ , െ
ଵ
ଷቁቃ.    
 
4. Remarks 
Kaneko (2016) includes more results related to the theorem.  It proposes that, for all scoring 
voting methods, the image of the expanded indecision region for CI by the one-to-one map 
from a pairwise voting vector to a scoring voting vector with the normalized Borda scoring 
vector is adopted as the indecision region, though the maximal translation is proved to be 
larger than that for non-Borda scoring methods.  But it is proved that, by doing so, the 
threshold value for a pairwise voting on a pair of alternatives which guarantees that a scoring 
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voting method avoids the indecision is maximized at the normalized Borda method, so that CI 
discredits the Borda method more than other scoring methods.  Another use of a threshold  to 
expand indifference regions in which two alternatives are tied at the top is considered in the 
article, and it turns out that such a use of threshold does not translate to a meaningful 
elimination of perturbations by confused voters that misrepresent the preference intensity for 
two alternatives.  A perturbation that a confuse voter breaks a tie between c1 and c2 for c1's 
win by CI is a convex combination of ቀଵଶ , 0,
ଵ
ଶ , 0, െ1,0ቁand ቀ0,1,0, െ
ଵ
ଶ , 0, െ
ଵ
ଶቁ, scaled by a small positive number.  In both perturbation profiles, the preference intensity of  c1 over c2 
increases without affecting the vote on a pair  ሼܿଵ, ܿଶሽ.  This perturbation of a profile breaks a tie between c1 and c2 by moving the pairwise voting vector to the direction ሺ2, െ1, െ1ሻby the 
small scale, which is a normal vector for the plane dividing C1 and C2 that heads toward C1.  
But such a  perturbation of a pairwise voting vector is also created by the perturbation profile 
ቀെ1, െ ଵଶ ,
ଵ
ଶ , െ
ଵ
ଶ ,
ଵ
ଶ , 1ቁ scaled by the same small positive number.  This perturbation profile does not manipulate the preference intensity of  c1 over c2  at all.   A perturbation by a 
misrepresenting confused voter leads to a profile with a negative ratio for some type if a 
perturbed profile gives a tie between c1 and c2 by a pairwise voting vector close to the 
boundary of ImF3, since a type that a misrepresenting confused voter reduces is scarce in such 
a profile.   
  The introduction of a threshold into the decision theory for expanding the indecision region 
is unpopular in two reasons.  One is that a threshold are given by the outset and not chosen 
optimality on some criterion.  The other is that the decision theorists are occupied with how to 
decide, not how to force the indecision.  The former is the common problem for all social 
decision with a threshold.  An optimization of  a threshold level requires a social interaction 
of voters other than the voting itself, and it would affect strategically on their voting 
behaviour.  The latter depends on an issue to be voted at hand.  If voters are choosing a 
congressman, a winner must be decided, otherwise registration procedures in the congress are 
severely restricted and all voters suffer from that.  However, if voters are choosing a long-
term social investment on infrastructures whose true benefits and costs have not been fully 
revealed yet,, there is no urgency to decide until a sufficient information on them becomes 
available.   
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